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ARBITRATION SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided several cases impacting important arbitration issues. Part I of this
Survey focuses on two decisions that addressed traditional labor law matters:
unionization and collective bargaining. These cases did not establish new law,
but rather reaffirmed existing precedent regarding the limited judicial review
of an arbitrator's decision. In Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 United
Food & Commercial Workers International Union,' the court reinforced the
principle that judicial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely narrow and
may come into play only if the arbitrator ignores the plain language of the
collective bargaining agreement.2 In Ryan v. City of Shawnee,' the court af-
firmed the limited judicial review of arbitration awards, and concluded that
prior judicial review of an arbitration award could not preclude a subsequent
civil rights action.'
In Part II, this Survey addresses two decisions that brought Tenth Circuit
law into greater conformity with other appellate courts. In Bowles Financial
Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.,' the Tenth Circuit decided to follow
those circuits exercising de novo review of a district court's determination re-
garding an arbitrator's compliance with statutory requirements.' Additionally,
in Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.,7 the Tenth Circuit followed the
majority of other circuits in adopting the view that a district court order to
arbitrate can only be final within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"),' if arbitrability was the sole issue before the district
court.
9
Together, the cases discussed in Parts I and II illustrate the Tenth
Circuit's adherence to precedent with regard to collective bargaining agree-
ments. The court continues, however, to establish new procedures for areas
where arbitration provides a less traditional arbitral forum for resolving dis-
putes.
1. 24 F.3d 86 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 87.
3. 13 F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. Id. at 348.
5. 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1012.
7. 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cit. 1994).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. 1994). See generally Gerald Aksen, Some Legal and Practical
Problems of Labor Arbitrators, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 163, 167 (Noel A. Levin et al.
eds., 1974) (Corp. L. & Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6) (providing background information on the
history and application of the FAA). For a further explanation of the FAA, see infra part II.A.
9. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
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I. ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS
A. Background
1. Evolution of Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitration can be defined as "the referral of a grievance by the
parties, union and management, through a voluntary arbitration clause in the
collective bargaining agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and
binding resolution."'0 The process is uniquely American and does not have a
deeply rooted tradition."
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or
"Wagner Act"), 2 giving workers the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, and providing safeguards from management interference. 3 The use of
arbitration to settle disputes became widespread in the 1940's as unionization
and collective bargaining began to form the basis of industrial labor organiza-
tions.'
4
In 1947, with the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA" or "Taft-Hartley Act"), 5 statutorily based grievance arbitration
provided guidance for lawsuits by and against labor organizations. 6 Section
185 of the LMRA gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims in-
volving breach of collective bargaining agreements." In addition, this statute
favored arbitration as the means for resolving disagreements associated with
collective bargaining agreements because it presumed the dispute arbitrable. 8
On June 20, 1960, the Supreme Court decided three cases that fashioned
the present-day laws of arbitration. These cases, commonly referred to as "The
10. Gerald Aksen, History and Development, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 9, 9 (Noel A.
Levin et al. eds., 1974) (Corp. L. & Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6).
11. Id.
12. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
13. Aksen, supra note. 10, at 10.
14. LEONARD L. RISKiN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DIsPurE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 301
(1987); Aksen, supra note 10, at 9.
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (cod-
ified at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)).
16. See RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 3.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (original version at ch. 120, title III, § 301, 61 Star. 156
(1947)). Section 185(a) provides in relevant part that "(sluits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization... may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties." In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that § 301 embodies a substantive component that authorizes federal
courts to develop a uniform national law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 451. The court also held that collective bargaining agreements that include arbitration claus-
es are enforceable under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. See also Douglas E. Ray, Court Review of La-
bor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (1987)
(pointing out that the issue had been hotly debated before Lincoln Mills). Prior to the decision in
Lincoln Mills, there was debate over whether § 301 was considered procedural or substantive.
Aksen, supra note 10, at 15.
18. Jerome Lefkowitz, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Public Sector, in




Steelworkers Trilogy," 9  established guidelines for determining the
arbitrability of labor disputes and the extent to which arbitration awards would
be reviewed and enforced." In United Steelworkers of America v. American
Manufacturing, the Court, relying in part on the LMRA, held that when a
collective bargaining agreement called for arbitration of all grievances, no ex-
ception should be read into the grievance clause.2 In United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the Court established that the
federal policy was to promote industry stabilization through collective bargain-
ing agreements.22 According to the Court in United Steelworkers of America
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., therefore, courts must refrain from review-
ing the merits of an arbitration award handed down as part of a collective
bargaining agreement. 3
The Steelworkers Trilogy led to continued reliance on arbitration as the
preferred method for settling labor disputes under a collective bargaining
agreement, replacing the traditional lockout or strike.2" Arbitration of labor
disputes was seen as a substitute for industrial turmoil and a way to increase
security and peace in industry.' By the 1980s, over ninety percent of collec-
tive bargaining agreements between labor and management provided for some
form of grievance procedure resulting in arbitration.26
2. Role of the Arbitrator
Labor arbitrators function much differently than a traditional judge. 7
Arbitrators for labor disputes are generally chosen for their knowledge and
19. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Private Sec-
tor, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACICAL GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 18, 21 (Max Zimny et al.
eds., 1990).
20. The Steelworkers Trilogy included United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 568 (1960) (prohibiting federal courts from weighing the merits of a grievance when the
parties have agreed by collective bargaining to resolve all questions of contract interpretation
through arbitration). The role of the courts is to determine whether the particular claim is gov-
erned by the contract. Id. at 568. The second case was United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (holding that arbitration of labor disputes is different
than arbitration of a commercial agreement). Under the collective bargaining agreement, arbitration
is an integral part of the bargaining process distinct from the actual dispute. Id. at 578. Although
the collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of the parties, it is much more than
just a contract: it is a complete agreement covering the entire employment relationship, including
ways to address unanticipated issues. Id. The final case of the Trilogy was United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (defining the scope of the arbitration
award as legitimate so long as it "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement).
The essence test states that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." Id.
at 597. See also St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 21 (explaining that a court is to resolve all doubts
in favor of arbitration, even frivolous claims).
21. American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. at 567; see also 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988) (provid-
ing that conciliation and mediation services should be used only as a last resort).
22. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.
23. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
24. AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
25. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578.
26. Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 197, 197 (1989).
27. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
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expertise in a specialized field.2" As described below, arbitrators may rely not
only upon their own experience, but upon what has been termed "industrial
common law"-practices common to the particular working environment or
industry that are not expressly contained within the agreement."
Although the arbitrator has substantial authority, many labor practices
remain "strictly a function of management."3 ° Management generally hires,
fires, pays, promotes and supervises employees,3' so the arbitrator's role is
limited to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment." Although the arbitrator may consult outside sources for guidance, the
award must derive from the substance of the bargaining agreement.33
3. Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the judicial review of an arbitration
award is extremely limited and that the district court should defer to the deci-
sion of the arbitrator whenever possible.34 Recently, the Tenth Circuit ap-
proved of this philosophy by stating that judicial review of an arbitration
award "is among the narrowest known to the law."35 In fact, the vast majority
of arbitration cases do not require judicial intervention.36 The proper approach
under a collective bargaining agreement, as set forth in the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy, is for a court to refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration
award.37 The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes would ap-
pear meaningless if the courts could indiscriminately set aside awards.38
4. Common Law of the Shop
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.," the Supreme
Court held, for the first time, that a collective bargaining agreement creates a
new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant.l Except where explicitly limited by contract, an arbitrator is not con-
28. Id. at 582. The American Arbitration Association maintains a National Panel of Arbitra-
tors who are nominated and selected based on their experience, competence, and impartiality. Don
A. Banta, Arbitrator Selection: A Management View, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACICAL
GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 93, 94 (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990).
29. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
30. Id. at 584 (defining "strictly management function" as any practice in the agreement
during which management is permitted to retain complete control and discretion).
31. Id. at 583.
32. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597.
33. Id.
34. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
35. Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 24 F.3d 86, 87 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food & Commer-
cial Workers, Local No. 7, 886 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1989)).
36. St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 18. Out of the approximately 50,000 arbitration cases that
are decided annually, traditionally only a few hundred are litigated in court. Id.
37. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596; L. Robert Griffin, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 193, 194-95 (Noel A. Levin et al. eds., 1974) (Corp. L. &
Prac. Sourcebook Series No. 6).
38. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
39. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
40. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 579; see also NCR Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists &
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fined to the express provisions of the contract." The nature of the agreement
encourages the arbitrator to consider and rely upon extrinsic evidence as an
equal part of the collective bargaining agreement.42 Prior negotiations be-
tween the parties, evidence of past labor practices and the daily routine of the
plant all make up the common law of the shop and may factor into the
arbitrator's ultimate decision.43 Labor arbitrators are not selected to further
the law, but rather to serve the parties in the collective bargaining agree-
ment."M Recent Tenth Circuit opinions have upheld the importance of the
common law of the shop in interpreting labor contracts.45
5. Arbitrability of a Dispute
Parties cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute that does not fall within the
intended scope of the arbitration clause in their agreement.' In AT & T Tech-
nologies Inc. v. Communications Workers, 7 the Court affirmed the well-es-
tablished test from the Steelworker's Trilogy for determining the arbitrability
of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.' Four rules govern a
court's evaluation of an arbitration agreement and have led to continued reli-
ance on arbitration as the preferred method of resolving labor disputes.49
First, since arbitration is a matter of contract, a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any issue the parties have not previously agreed to arbi-
trate.5" Second, the question of arbitrability under the agreement is a matter
for the court to decide.5' Third, when deciding whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate on a particular issue, the court may not assess the merits of
Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 70, 906 F.2d 1499, 1501 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that
the role of the common law of the shop had been "forcefully restated" by the Tenth Circuit).
41. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 581.
42. Id. at 581-82.
43. Eva Robins, The Law of the Shop, in LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
ADVOCATES 229, 232 (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990).
44. Id. at 230-31.
45. See NCR, 906 F.2d at 1501 n.3.
46. Alison B. Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1143 (1986).
47. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
48. 475 U.S. 643, 648-51 (1986). In addition to the cases already discussed, the Tenth Cir-
cuit decided the arbitrability of a dispute involving an employee grievance system. In
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Local Union No. 998, United Rubber Workers, 4 F.3d 913 (10th
Cir. 1993), Firestone instituted an Employee Suggestion System in the 1920s to give employees
incentives to come up with ways to improve safety and efficiency at the plant. Id. at 920. One
employee, a union member, made a suggestion through the system which the company ultimately
adopted. Id. The employee was paid $2,250 for his suggestion, but claimed he was owed more. Id.
When the employee filed a grievance with the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment requesting arbitration of the dispute, Firestone refused and brought an action in district court
to prevent further processing of the grievance and to obtain a declaration that the grievance did
not fall within the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Firestone. Id. The Tenth Circuit,
relying on the AT & T four-part test for arbitrability affirmed the district court decision. Id. at 921.
The court found that the Employee Suggestion System had never been the subject of collective
bargaining, and since it provided its own internal procedures for review of grievances related to
the Suggestion System, the System was complete in and of itself. Id. at 922.
49. AT & T, 475 U.S. at 648-49; St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 24-25.
50. AT & T, 475 U.S. at 648.
51. Id. at649.
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the claims." Fourth, where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is
a presumption in favor of arbitrability unless the clause cannot clearly be
interpreted in a way that covers the dispute.53
Doubts regarding the arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor
of coverage by the agreement.54 This presumption "recognizes the greater
institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements" and advances the federal labor policy of peacefully resolving
labor disputes.55
B. Champion Boxed Beef Co. v. Local No. 7 Union Food & Commercial
Workers International Union56
1. Facts
The Champion Boxed Beef Co. ("Champion") sought judicial review of a
labor arbitrator's decision. 7 The arbitrator found that Champion lacked suffi-
cient cause to discharge a union employee and ordered his reinstatement.58
The Champion employee was asked by his supervisor to take time off his
usual job, catching and sorting the product as it came off the line, and to take
a temporary assignment at the unloading dock.59 When the employee did not
perform the temporary assignment, Champion discharged him for insubordina-
tion and refusal to perform reasonable work. 6
The employee filed a grievance that was referred to arbitration pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement.6 The arbitrator held that Champion did
not have sufficient cause to discharge the employee because the employee's
actions did not constitute insubordination or refusal to perform work within
the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.62
In federal district court, Champion sought to vacate the arbitrator's award
and the union filed a counterclaim to enforce the award.63 The district court
granted Champion's motion for summary judgment and vacated the award,
holding that the arbitrator "stray[ed] beyond the four corners of the [collective
bargaining] agreement" and, therefore, exceeded his authority.'
52. Id.
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 24 F.3d 86 (10th Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 87.
58. Id. at 87-88.
59. Id. at 87.
60. Id.
61. Id. The relevant portion of the agreement stated "[no employee covered by this Agree-
ment shall be ... dismissed without just and sufficient cause. Sufficient cause of discharge shall
include ... insubordination ... [and] refusal to perform any reasonable work, service or labor
when required to do so by the Company." Id. at 88.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 87.
64. Id. at 88.
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit applied de novo review as it has in other cases where
the district court granted summary judgement.65 The court first looked at the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the basis of the arbitrator's
decision.' In making the decision, the arbitrator had examined the language
of the agreement and listened to testimony concerning Champion's current
practice, the "common law of the shop," regarding times when other employ-
ees had declined to accept work assignments.67 The arbitrator determined that
the employee never said he would not perform the requested work.' In addi-
tion, the arbitrator found that the employee had a physical reason for declining
the assignment, of which the company was aware.'
The Tenth Circuit explained that an arbitrator may consider and rely on
extrinsic evidence, except where expressly limited by agreement.7" When in-
terpreting provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator may
look to past practices in the industry and to the common law of the shop.7'
The court then held that the phrase "reasonable work", as stated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, was ambiguous, but it refused to confirm or reject
the arbitrator's interpretation of the term.72 The court recognized that it may
not overrule an arbitrator's factual finding or contract interpretation simply be-
cause it disagrees with it.7" The court concluded that the award drew its "es-
sence"74 from the collective bargaining agreement and that the arbitrator was
entitled to consider the common law of the shop in his decision.75 According-
ly, the court reversed the district court order vacating the arbitration award and
remanded the case with instructions to enter an order of enforcement.76
3. Analysis
In Champion, the court did not create new legal principles, but instead
followed established precedent. Due to the diminished power of labor organi-
zations today, arbitration in this area often relies on precedent, which contrasts
with the approach of other contemporary arbitration fields.77 The court in
65. Id. at 87.
66. Id. at 88.
67. Id.; see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for an explanation of the common law
of the shop.
68. Id. at 88.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 88-89. Examples of extrinsic evidence may also include the negotiating and con-
tractual history of the parties. Id.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 20 for an explanation of the essence test.
75. Champion, 24 F.3d at 89.
76. Id.
77. See R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual Autonomy and the
Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 HouS. L. REv. 1863, 1866 (1994)
(indicating that while unions are becoming less visible in the American workplace, arbitration will
continue to play a role in maintaining individual rights). For examples of other areas where ar-
bitration is used, see Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitration in Professional
Baseball, I SPORTs LAW J. 183 (1994); Donna Bialik et al., Higher Education: Fertile Ground for
1995]
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Champion recognized and relied upon three essential principles of arbitration
in its opinion. First, the court reviewed a well-known standard established over
thirty years ago by the Supreme Court that "[tihe refusal of courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements.""8 The importance of this principle cannot
be understated, for absent such a standard, the federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined. The arbitration process is built
on a premise of arbitral authority. If courts are allowed to make the final
determination on arbitration awards, the entire mechanism becomes frustrated.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the essence test for judicial review. The
essence test requires a court to examine the parties' mutual intent and recog-
nize their contract to arbitrate disputes.79 By entering into an agreement that
includes an arbitration clause, the parties bind themselves to the arbitrator's
decision and, unless a court is convinced the arbitrator committed a serious
error, the court should not overturn the arbitral decision."0 An arbitration
award must be enforced if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement."'" Although arbitrators must adhere to the interpretation and ap-
plication of the collective bargaining agreement, they may also look to some
outside sources for guidance as long as the award remains principally based on
the agreement itself 2
In addition to the narrow scope of judicial review and the essence test, the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Champion emphasized the importance of the com-
mon law of the shop when rendering an arbitral decision. 3 As previously
discussed, arbitrators are usually chosen because of their knowledge about a
particular industry's practice and custom. 4 The parties assume the arbitrator
will take into account any impact his decision might have on productivity and
morale. 5 In fact, the industrial common law is "equally part of the collective
bargaining agreement although not expressed in it."'8 6 If arbitrators did not
possess the implied authority to reach beyond the four comers of the docu-
ment, the character of labor arbitration would be severely limited. 7
Judicial deference to arbitration decisions is extremely beneficial to the
process because it allows the arbitrator to maintain governing authority over
the dispute. Challenging the arbitral decision involves dragging the controversy
into time-consuming and expensive litigation, effectively undermining exactly
ADR, [49-Mar.] DIsP. RESOL. J. 61 (1994).
78. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 596.
79. See Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7,
886 F.2d 275, 276 (10th Cir. 1989).
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597).
82. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 597.
83. Champion, 24 F.3d at 88-89.
84. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
85. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582.
86. Id. at 581-82.
87. Id. at 582. The uniqueness of labor arbitration must be emphasized. The entire collective
bargaining effort is a type of industrial self-government. Id. at 580. The arbitrator becomes part of
the process of "self-government" the parties have created and furthers the common goals of unin-
terrupted production and specialized solutions. Id. at 582.
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what the arbitration process seeks to avoid.
C. Arbitration and Civil Rights
Although judicial deference is preferred in most instances, the Supreme
Court held in three cases that an adverse decision under a collective bargain-
ing agreement does not prevent an employee from instituting an action under a
statute creating individual rights."s The mid-1980s and early 1990s witnessed
a resurgence of Supreme Court confidence in the suitability for arbitration of
statutorily based claims.8 9 Lower courts, however, remain divided on whether
private agreements to arbitrate statutory rights are enforceable.' Although
arbitration is appropriate for resolving many contractual disputes, it is not an
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting federal statutory and
constitutional civil rights.9'
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,92 the Court rejected the rule of de-
ferral and held that an employee's claim under Title VII9 was not precluded
by a prior arbitral decision against him.94 The Court stated arbitration was "a
88. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (holding that
prior submission of a grievance to dispute resolution procedures under a contract would not bar a
subsequent claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where a police officer had received an
adverse ruling in arbitration, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to
bar a civil rights action); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) (holding that
an adverse award in arbitration would not bar a subsequent action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). See generally Robert G. Howlett, Why Arbitrators Apply External Law, in
LABOR ARBrrRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 257, 264-68 (Max Zimny et al. eds.,
1990) (noting, however, that nothing in the three opinions "supports a conclusion that arbitrators
should not apply applicable law").
89. Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 779, 789 (1992). See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-
86 (1989) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the Securities Act is en-
forceable, overruling Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). The Court noted that, beginning with
the lower courts, judicial hostility to arbitration had decreased over the years. Rodriguez, 490 U.S.
at 480. This was confirmed when the Supreme Court endorsed arbitration of federal statutory
rights in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at
480. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that an
agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is enforce-
able). The Court's decision in Gilmer indicates a shift from restraint to deference with regard to
agreements to arbitrate disputes arising under Title VII. See Plass, supra, at 779-80. Additionally,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which amended Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contains language that encourages arbitration.
90. Plass, supra note 89, at 789.
91. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290; Howlett, supra note 88, at 264-69. As an example of a con-
stitutional right not appropriate for arbitration, McDonald pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 466 U.S.
at 285 n.l. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United Sates or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
92. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
94. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49, 56-59. The Court held that "Title VII's purpose and proce-
dures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first
1995]
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comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by
Title VII."9' In Alexander, the Court concluded that the federal policies fa-
voring arbitration of labor disputes and prohibiting discriminatory practices in
the workplace should complement one another.96 Therefore, an employee
should be allowed to pursue a remedy through arbitration as provided by the
collective bargaining agreement, as well as in court, pursuant to Title VII.97
The informality of the arbitration process often contributes to the efficient,
inexpensive and expeditious nature of the procedure. 98 These same character-
istics, however, make arbitration a less desirable forum for the resolution of
individual civil rights claims.99
D. Ryan v. City of Shawnee"'
1. Facts
In Ryan, a black firefighter, sued the City of Shawnee, Oklahoma, in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,'0 ' 1983, °2 and Title
VII,' °3 alleging illegal race discrimination." Plaintiff, Nathaniel Ryan, was
the city's first and only black firefighter. 5 Mr. Ryan asserted that during his
employment "he was subjected to racial slurs and jokes, disciplined more
harshly than white employees, subjected to discriminatory promotion practices,
and eventually discharged because of his race.""'" Upon termination, Mr.
Ryan filed a grievance with the firefighters union, who addressed the matter in
arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and the city. 7
During the arbitration proceeding, the union did not pursue the issues of
harassment, discipline, and promotions." The arbitrator determined that the
pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement." Id. at 49. The employee in Gardner-Denver, unlike the employee in Gilmer,
did not choose to limit his rights by agreeing to arbitrate his title VII claims. See Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 35; Plass, supra note 89, at 790-91.
95. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56. The Court expressed its concern that the factf'mding process
in arbitration is usually not equivalent to judicial factfinding and stated that an arbitrator's experi-
ence encompasses "the law of the shop and not the law of the land." Id. at 57. This idea, that the
judicial process was superior to arbitration for resolving disputes involving statutory claims, was
overturned in Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5, noted in Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec. Inc., 781
F.Supp. 1475, 1481 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
96. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
97. Id. The cases following Gilmer, however, appear to place the burden of showing that
Congress did not intend to preclude the statutorily based claim on the individual opposing arbitra-
tion. See Plass, supra note 89, at 790 n.57.
98. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
99. Id.
100. 13 F.3d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).







city violated the collective bargaining agreement because it failed to afford
Mr. Ryan dismissal procedures which were required under the agreement."l
The arbitrator expressly declined to rule on the merits of the claim and or-
dered that Mr. Ryan be reinstated with backpay."'
Two subsequent lawsuits followed. Mr. Ryan filed a race discrimination
claim in federal district court and the city challenged the arbitration award in
state court."' After the state court affirmed the arbitrator's award, the federal
district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on Ryan's civil
rights claims."' The court declared that any consequential damages should
be resolved under the collective bargaining agreement and that the process was
over. 1'3
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
In Ryan, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in
Alexander" and McDonald', acknowledging that arbitration is not an
adequate substitute for a court proceeding when adjudicating claims under
Title VII and § 1983."6 In addition, the Tenth Circuit looked to these cases
in holding that an arbitration award does not bar a subsequent cause of action
under § 1981."'
The Tenth Circuit declared that because the purpose of arbitration is to
avoid court intervention, a court may only intervene to examine whether the
arbitrator's decision drew its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.' 18 In explaining the concept of issue preclusion, the court said it does
not apply "when the party against whom the earlier decision is interposed did
not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate the critical issue in the earlier
case."' 9
In Ryan, the state proceeding was limited to the city's challenge of the
arbitration award and did not address Mr. Ryan's civil rights claims. 2 ° The
Tenth Circuit reasoned that because the state judicial proceeding did not afford
Mr. Ryan an opportunity to present his civil rights claims, it could not pre-
clude further litigation of his federal claims. 2' Accordingly, the court re-





113. Id. at 347.
114. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
115. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
116. Ryan, 13 F.3d at 347.
117. Id. at 347 n.l. In Alexander, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not waive the
right to a trial de novo by first pursuing arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. Alex-
ander, 415 U.S. at 49.
118. Ryan, 13 F.3d at 348.
119. Id. (quoting Underside v. Lathrop, 645 P.2d 514, 516 n.6 (Okla. 1982) (quoting Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980))).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 346, 350.
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3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Ryan focused on the limitations of arbitration, main-
taining that "arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial
proceedings in adjudicating [civil rights] claims."'23 Although arbitrators are
often familiar with the procedures of the workplace, they may not have "the
expertise required to solve the complex legal issues presented by the civil
rights statutes.' 2 4 In addition, as the court correctly pointed out, the arbitra-
tor is only authorized to interpret the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.'25 A civil rights claim may conflict with this agreement, therefore,
making the courtroom the proper forum in which to decide civil rights cases.
However broad the arbitrator's authority, it is by no means exclusive and
cannot preclude certain substantive claims by union employees. 26 An arbitra-
tor has no authority to enforce civil rights laws in conflict with rights protect-
ed under the collective bargaining agreement. 27 The arbitration process has
the potential to deprive an employee of their constitutional rights because it
might not be in the union's interest to vigorously pursue such a claim.
2
1
An employee's statutory rights exist independent from constitutional
rights, even if the same occurrence violates both categories of rights. 29 The
federal government has enacted statutory protection for individuals that may
not be waived through a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The Ryan court
properly adhered to well-established precedent in holding that Mr. Ryan may
pursue his civil rights claims in a court of law.
II. ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Background
1. Introduction
Although arbitration enjoys widespread use in labor relations, it is recog-
nized in commercial areas as well. 3' In 1925, Congress enacted the United
States Arbitration Act, now known as the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),132 to alleviate judicial hostility towards arbitration and provide ju-
dicial enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate. 3  The FAA established
a federal policy favoring arbitration by giving courts the power to compel
123. Id. at 347 (quoting McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984)).





129. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50.
130. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 n.3 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Barrentine,
450 U.S. at 740 (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 37 (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
131. See generally Overby, supra note 46 (discussing the substantive arbitrability of disputes
under the FAA).
132. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1-9 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
133. Overby, supra note 46, at 1141-42.
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arbitration, stay proceedings pending arbitration, and affirm arbitral
awards. 34 Judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements allowed the courts
to achieve the Act's other goal-to provide fast and efficient dispute resolu-
tion and lighten the case loads of federal courts.'35
2. Second Arbitration Trilogy
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided a group of consolidated cases known
as the "Second Arbitration Trilogy."'36 In this new trilogy, the Supreme
Court approved the federalization of arbitration, established that the FAA
applies in state courts, and declared that issues of arbitrability should be de-
cided in accordance with the federal policy favoring arbitration.'37 The cases
comprising the Second Arbitration Trilogy sought to strengthen, and even
broaden, the scope of the FAA and the federal policy of enforcing agreements
to arbitrate absent a ground for revocation.'38
3. Fundamentally Fair Hearing
The courts have created a basic requirement that both parties to an arbitra-
tion be afforded a "fundamentally fair hearing.' ' 39 Arbitration proceedings
are not bound by the formal rules of evidence or procedure, unless expressly
agreed to by the parties."4 Although the requirements vary by state, most
courts agree that a fundamentally fair hearing requires only notice, the oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present evidence, the opportunity to make an argu-
ment before the decision makers, and decision makers free from bias.' 4' In
fact, the FAA allows arbitration to go forward "with only a summary hearing
134. Id. at 1137.
135. Id. at 1141.
136. The first case of the Second Arbitration Trilogy was Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985) (holding that the FAA requires district courts to compel arbitration of pen-
dent arbitrable claims when one party files such a motion, even if it would mean inefficiency).
The Court explained that the Act gave district courts no discretion to decide the arbitrability of
issues about which an arbitration agreement has been signed. Id. at 218. The second case was
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 14-15 (1984) (pointing out that Congress mandated
the enforcement of arbitration agreements and ultimately holding that the scope of the FAA en-
compasses claims in state court). The Court recognized only two limitations on the enforceability
of provisions governed by the FAA. First, "they must be part of a written maritime contract or a
contract 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce."' Id. at 11. Second, "such clauses may be
revoked upon 'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Id. (quot-
ing 9 U.S.C. § 2). The final case of the Trilogy was Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that § 2 of the FAA effectively creates substantial
federal law regarding arbitrability and that it overrides any contrary state policy). See generally
Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (tracing the origins and assessing the future application of the FAA).
137. See Hirshman, supra note 136, at 1306-07. Section 2 of the FAA is the primary sub-
stantive provision of the Act and provides that an arbitration agreement "in any maritime transac-
tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract." Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
138. See Hirshman, supra note 136, at 1352-53.
139. Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (10th Cir.
1994).
140. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
141. Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1013.
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and with restricted inquiry into factual issues."'42
Despite the fundamentally fair hearing requirements, courts continue to
afford the arbitrator wide latitude in making an award.'43 For instance, in
Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,' the court held that errors in
the arbitrator's interpretation of the law or findiigs of fact did not warrant
reversal of the decision.' "A court can set aside an arbitration award only if
one of the statutory or judicial grounds for vacation has been proven."'4
4. Vacation and Review of Arbitrators Award Under FAA § 10
Under § 10 of the FAA, any party to the arbitration can apply to vacate
an arbitration award:
1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means. 2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrator or either of them. 3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct, in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced. 4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers .... 5) where an award is vacated and the time within which
the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 47
5. Stay of Proceedings Under FAA § 3
Section 3 of the FAA addresses lawsuits brought in federal court regard-
ing issues that the parties agreed to in writing prior to the dispute."' In Mo-
ses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,49 the Su-
preme Court recognized that although § 3 of the FAA refers to a suit "in any
of the courts of the United States," both state and federal courts are obligated
142. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 685.
143. Id.
144. 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 635.
146. Bowles, 22 F.3d at 1014. See infra note 147 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award.
147. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The plain language of § 10 suggests the provi-
sion is not applicable to an action to vacate brought in state court. The decisions of state courts,
however, are divided with regard to the applicability of § 10. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 676 (1994).
148. 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides:
[If] any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which suit is pending ... shall on the application of one of the parties stay the trial
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, pro-
viding the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988)
The Supreme Court has not clarified whether or not a § 3 claim is applicable to actions in
state court. Lower courts have generally held that either § 3 applies to state courts or that the FAA
requires state courts to grant comparable stays. BORN, supra note 147, at 229.
149. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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to grant stays of litigation. 5 ' In most cases, a § 3 stay is enough to ade-
quately protect the right to arbitration, but in special cases a stay of litigation
is not enough and the courts must rely on other provisions of the FAA to
grant the parties relief."'
6. Ex Parte Communications
Reversal of an arbitral decision based solely on ex parte communication
with an arbitrator is rare. For example, in Creative Homes & Millwork, Inc. v.
Hinkle,' an arbitrator's ex parte contact with a party's witness, after testi-
mony, to discuss possible employment, was not "misconduct" warranting
vacation of the arbitration award.' Additionally, in Vincent Builders, Inc. v.
American Application Systems, Inc.,' the plaintiff failed to prove that one
of the arbitrators engaged in improper ex parte communications with the
defendant's attorney and representatives of the defendant corporation.' The
court in Vincent stated that ex parte communications must involve facts, issues
or evidence relevant to the subject of the arbitration.'56 Rule 29 of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association's Rules and Code of Ethics, however, states that
"[tihere shall be no direct communication between the parties and a neutral
arbitrator other than at oral hearings.""' To prevent disputes regarding ex
parte communications with an arbitrator, the parties should put an express
clause in their contract about the nature of any such contact or prohibit it
entirely.
7. Section 16(a)(3) of the FAA
Section 16 of the FAA authorizes immediate appellate review of an order
"refusing a stay" of litigation pending arbitration or an order denying a motion
to compel arbitration. 58 On the other hand, § 16 of the FAA provides for
immediate review of a decision favoring arbitration under only two circum-
stances.'59 First, when the district court's order represents "'a final decision
with respect to arbitration""' and second, "when 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) pro-
vides the means for an interlocutory appeal."'
' 6'
Section 16(a)(3) focuses on the first of the two circumstances: when a
150. Id. at 27 n.34.
151. Id. at 27. A state may need to rely on § 4 of the FAA to compel arbitration, where in a
case similar to Moses the party opposing arbitration is not the one from whom payment or perfor-
mance is sought. Id.
152. 426 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. 1993).
153. Id. at 482-83.
154. 547 A.2d 1381 (Conn. 1988).
155. Id. at 1386-87.
156. Id.
157. Creative Homes, 426 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting the American Arbitration Association, Con-
struction Industry Arbitration Rules § 29 (1991)).
158. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (a)(1)(A-C) (Supp. 1993). Section 16 was originally codified at 9 U.S.C. §
51. It was renumbered by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Title III,
§ 325 (a)(1), 104 Stat. 5089, 5120 (1990).
159. Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 1993).
160. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3)).
161. Id.
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final decision is made regarding arbitration.'62 A decision is final and appeal-
able if it ends the litigation on its merits and leaves nothing for the district
court to preside over other than execution of judgement.'63 An order compel-
ling arbitration is final when it results from a proceeding in which the only
issue is the arbitrability of the dispute."M The court in Humphrey held that
absent a "final decision" incapable of review at any other point, the court of
appeals was precluded from reviewing the district court's decision favoring
arbitration.65
8. "Embedded" Proceeding and Independent Action
The question of whether a dispute is arbitrable can arise incident to the
pending action or as an entirely independent action." If the arbitrable issue
is "embedded," a proceeding whereby the issue has been raised pendent to a
larger action, then the statute generally allows an immediate appeal only from
decisions against arbitration. 67 The statute "bars an immediate appeal when
the decision is in favor of arbitration."'" On the other hand, if the case pres-
ents arbitrability as the sole issue, the order is considered final and appellate
review is immediately available. 69
Although the rules governing arbitration proceedings open the door to
various areas of litigation, the FAA focuses on ensuring parties a fair hearing
and on limiting court intervention in arbitration agreements. These aspects of
the FAA are the subject of the following Tenth Circuit opinions on attorney
conduct and appellate review.
B. Bowles Financial Group Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. 70
1. Facts
In Bowles, a dispute arose concerning the amount of compensation owed
Bowles Financial Company ("Bowles") by Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. ("Stifel") for
the nonperformance of financial services. 7' The parties submitted the matter
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an agreement granting the arbi-
trator sole authority to govern the procedural rules of the dispute.' At vari-
ous times during the proceedings, counsel for Bowles intentionally, affirma-
tively, and repeatedly communicated to the arbitrators a previous settlement
offer made by Stiefel."3 The district court expressed shock as to the
162. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (a)(3).
163. American Casualty Co. v. L-J, Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1994); Humphrey, 4 F.3d
at 317.
164. Humphrey, 4 F.3d at 317.
165. Id. at 319.
166. Id. at 316.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 317.
170. 22 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1994).





counsel's actions, but held that the arbitration hearing was not "fundamentally
unfair"' and allowed the arbitration award to stand.'75
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision
that the counsel's actions did not warrant vacation of the arbitral award.'76
First, the court discussed several features of arbitration and declared that "by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the opportunity for review by the court-
room for the [perceived] simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitra-
tion."" 77 The court noted that the only requirement an arbitrator must grant
the parties is a fundamentally fair hearing,' and that no evidence was pre-
sented to suggest the hearing was not fundamentally fair.'79
The court then considered the appropriate level of review for evaluating a
district court's decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award. Past Tenth
Circuit decisions had reviewed a district court's decision to confirm, vacate or
deny a motion to vacate an arbitration award without reference to the standard
of review. 8 ' The court realized, however, that the standard plays an impor-
tant role in ensuring that arbitrators comply with statutory requirements.
Therefore, the court followed the decisions of other circuits' and applied de
novo review in Bowles.1
8 2
The court went on to emphasize the narrowness of its review,"8 3 stating
that error in the arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact do not
merit reversal.' 8' Statutory and other legal requirements imposed upon arbi-
tration contracts, proceedings, and awards are the only tools employed when
vacating a decision.'85 Although the court expressed dismay at the counsel's
conduct, nothing in the arbitration agreement explicitly condemned the com-
munication of settlement offers to the arbitrators.' 86 The court does not have
174. Id. at 1013. Courts tend to agree that a fundamentally fair hearing only requires notice,
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence before the decision makers, and that the decision
makers be free from bias, while the FAA allows arbitration to proceed with only a summary hear-
ing and with restricted inquiry into the factual issues. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1014.
177. Id. at 1012 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29-33
(1991)).
178. Id. at 1013 ("[A] fundamentally fair hearing requires only notice, opportunity to be
heard, and to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decisionmakers, and
that the decisionmakers are not infected with bias.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1012.
181. Id. (citing Atlantic Aviation Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., 11 F.3d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir.
1994); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1993);
Employers Ins. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991)).
182. Id.
183. Id. The FAA allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitration award in limited circum-
stances including when the award was procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means; when there
is evidence of partiality or corruption by the arbitrators; where there was misconduct by the arbi-
trators; or where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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the power to impose its rules of evidence on the arbitration proceedings. After
reviewing the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that none of
the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award existed.'87
3. Analysis
It is important to limit federal court intervention in arbitration agreements.
It would undermine the arbitration process to arbitrate and litigate a dispute.
The federal court's hands should, therefore, be tied in such cases so as not to
frustrate the process.
a. De novo Review
On a hearing de novo, the court reviews the matter as a court of original
jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction.'88 The court of appeals must,
therefore, adhere to the same standards of review that bound the district court.
Although de novo review is typically seen as giving the court broad discretion,
the limited review available to the district court in arbitration cases carries
over to the appellate court. This results in the Tenth Circuit being equally as
constrained as the district court in its ability to reverse an arbitral decision.
Federal policy favors judicial deference towards arbitration decisions and
mandates that courts do not intrude unnecessarily on contractually imposed
arbitration. 89 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Bowles follows the precedent
of other circuit courts and lends support to the arbitral process by demonstrat-
ing judicial respect towards arbitrators. In an arbitration decision, a federal
judge cannot make a broad decision which conflicts with the federal policy fa-
voring judicial deference.
b. Ex parte Communications
The behavior of Bowles's counsel is generally discouraged in arbitration,
although it was within the broad procedural rules agreed to by the parties. In a
courtroom, such conduct could result in serious sanctions. Courts, however, do
not have the authority to re-draft an arbitration agreement between the parties
and must enforce it as written.
The kind of behavior exhibited by Bowles's counsel was not expressly
prohibited by the agreement. The integrity of arbitration in the long run, how-
ever, depends upon the court's strict interpretation of arbitration agreements in
the short run. With their limited authority, courts must control the arbitration
process on a daily basis in order to prevent significant obstacles in the future.
Due to their freedom of contract, parties have only themselves to blame
for not incorporating an express prohibition against ex parte communications
into an arbitration agreement. Parties often choose arbitration because of the
broad contractual control over the process, and can avoid unwanted ex parte
187. Id.
188. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990).
189. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 682.
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communication by contracting to limit such behavior in advance, By expressly
contracting about acceptable ex parte communications, if any, the parties serve
the federal policy of keeping arbitration disputes out of court. The ability to
settle disputes through good faith and fair dealing is thwarted if the controver-
sy is complicated by excessive delay and costs caused by unwarranted judicial
interference.
C. Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.' 9
1. Facts
In Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., a distributor of school buses
("Adair") brought an action against the manufacturer of the buses ("Blue
Bird") for breach of contract. 9' The dispute arose when a Texas school dis-
trict canceled a substantial order with Adair because it questioned its authority
to sell Blue Bird buses in Texas. 9 Adair brought an action against Blue
Bird alleging breach of contract and requesting damages. 93 Adair also
sought a declaration that the arbitration clause in the arbitration agreement was
not applicable to the particular dispute.'94 The district court, finding that the
dispute was within the scope of the arbitration clause, ordered the parties to
proceed with arbitration pursuant to their prior agreement and dismissed the
complaint.'95 However, under § 3 of the FAA, the district court should have
granted defendant's motion to stay the action pending arbitration."9 Section
3 states that on application of either party, the court shall stay the trial until
arbitration has been held in accordance with the terms of the agreement."'
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
Due to the procedural error, the Tenth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction.
The court corrected the mistake by vacating the district court's order of dis-
missal and remanding the case for a stay pending arbitration. 99 The opinion
began with a discussion of Congress's intent in its 1988 amendment of the
FAA to "'promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit appeals
from orders directing arbitration.... ' 9 This fundamental principle locks the
parties into the prior arbitration agreement and emphasizes the importance of
allowing a hearing on the issue before any court intervention. Although this
Congressional policy was not fully implemented,2" the court reviewed the
190. 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
191. Id. at 953.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 954.
195. Id. at 954-55.
196. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
197. Id.
198. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
199. Id. (quoting Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
200. Id. ("Section 16(b)(1) and (2) prohibits appeals from interlocutory orders staying an
action pending arbitration pursuant to § 3 and from orders compelling arbitration to proceed under
§ 4.").
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general policy of § 16 of the FAA2°0 which allows an appeal to be taken
from a final arbitration decision."2
A majority of the circuits have adopted the view that, within the meaning
of § 16(a)(3), an order is final and immediately appealable only if arbitrability
is the sole issue before the district court .20  A minority of courts, on the oth-
er hand, hold that dismissal of a complaint raising issues other than
arbitrability are final and appealable under § 16(a)(3). 4 Without much dis-
cussion behind its holding, the Tenth Circuit agreed with and adopted the
majority approach, explaining only that a stay pending arbitration under § 3
will rarely be a final decision within § 16(a)(3).
The court concluded by declining to reach the merits of Adair's breach of
contract appeal, since it adopted the majority approach which discouraging
immediate appellate review in a proceeding where the arbitrability of the issue
is not the only relief sought. 5 In accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 3, the court
vacated the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for entry
of a stay pending arbitration.2°
3. Analysis
Although recently decided, Adair has become a leading case in the area of
arbitration appeals. Adair stands for the proposition that § 10 of the FAA
forecloses appellate review of district court arbitration decisions, unless the
201. 9 U.S.C. § 16 outlines when an appeal may be taken from a district court ruling involv-
ing arbitration:
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
(1) an order-
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to pro-
ceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title of compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an
arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be
taken from an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. V 1993).
202. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
203. Id. (citing Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93, 95 (8th Cir. 1994);
Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1993); S L H S.P.A. v. Miller-St.
Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1522 (7th Cir. 1993); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984
F.2d 58, 61 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993); Thompson McKinnon Sec., Inc. v. Salter, 873 F.2d 1397, 1399
(11 th Cir. 1989); Delta Computer Corp. v. Samsung Semiconductor & Telecommunications Co.,
879 F.2d 662, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1989).
204. Id. See Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1274-76 (6th Cir. 1990).
205. Adair, 25 F.3d at 954-55. Plaintiff also sought a declaratory judgement that the arbitra-





order can be characterized as a final decision, or falls within limited excep-
tions found in the subsections. In Adair, the district court dismissed the re-
maining claims in an embedded proceeding, but the order to arbitrate was not
appealable. Adair follows the rule adopted in Humphrey, "that an embedded
proceeding may not give rise to a final decision subject to section 16(a)(3)
review, even when all the claims in which the arbitration issue is embedded
are resolved.""2 7
Regarding the trial court's incorrect procedural ruling, the Tenth Circuit
followed correct FAA procedure by refusing to hear the case until arbitration
proceedings had been held. By adopting the majority view, which discourages
immediate appellate review other than where a determination of arbitrability is
the sole issue, the court ensured district court maintenance over the case. This
measure furthers the federal policy discouraging court intervention. Under the
majority view, only questions as to the arbitrability of the underlying dispute
itself are referred to the appellate level, thereby reducing the number of arbi-
tration appeals.
Consistent with the majority decision, an order does not constitute a final
decision if issues other than arbitrability are raised. Stays pending arbitration
entered pursuant to § 16(a)(3), however, will be few because of the interlocu-
tory effect of § 3."2 Section 3 encompasses disputes brought on "any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing," and, therefore, the
likelihood of issues other than the dispute's arbitrability is inherent."z9 Due to
the wide coverage of § 3, a stay pending arbitration will almost always be
naturally embedded in the dispute and will be characterized as interlocutory,
not as a final decision under § 16(a)(2).
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the declining state of labor organizations, labor arbitra-
tion remains distinct with "its own traditions and with a common bond of
precedent and practice."12 0 Relying on the principle of judicial deference, the
Tenth Circuit reemphasized the narrow scope of review applied to arbitration
awards in Champion. However, the court noted that civil rights are one excep-
tion to the federal policy favoring arbitration, as illustrated in the Ryan de-
cision.
In addition to labor organizations, arbitration is also commonly used in
commercial contexts. The cases surveyed reveal the Tenth Circuit's reliance
on the FAA to guide its decisions. The court has followed the latest trends by
establishing de novo review of district court orders in Bowles and by its inter-
pretation of FAA § 16 in Adair. In its recent arbitration cases, the Tenth Cir-
207. Humphrey v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 318 (1993); Adair, 25 F.3d at 955. See
also American Casualty Co. v. L-J Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the result
in Humphrey is consistent with a majority of other circuits).
208. Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
209. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).
210. David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor Arbitration, [48-Sep.]
ARB. J. 18, 24 (1993).
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cuit has exhibited an overall willingness to defer to the arbitration process,
contributing to the continued success of arbitration in the future.
Kerri M. Pertcheck
